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RICHARD K. NICKLES and MARGARET K. ) 
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Defendant in ) 
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BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
NATURE OF CASE 
Centurian Corporation ("Centurian") brought a action 
against A. L. Cripps and Walter A. Cripps ("Cripps"), claiming 
amounts due under an agreement wherein Centurian Corporation 
had given possession of a tank trailer to Cripps. Petty Motor 
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Lease; Inc. moved to intervene in the action claiming an inter-
est in the tank trailer by having entered into agreements with 
Centurian and Richard and Margaret K. Nickles {"Nickles"). . The 
motion was granted and trial was held with all parties, includ-
ing Petty Motor Lease, Inc., present. Following trial, the 
trial court held that it was without jurisdiction of the com-
plaint in intervention of Petty Motor Lease, Inc. against Cen-
turian and Nickles. This Court reversed and remanded with in-
structions that the trial court enter judgment in accordance 
with the evidence presented at trial. Centurian Corporation v. 
A. L. Cripps, et. al~, Petty Motor Lease, Inc. v. Centurian 
Corporation, et. al., 577 P. 2d 955 {Utah 1978). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following remand from this Court, judgment was entered 
in favor of Petty Motor Lease, Inc., against Centurian and Nie-
kles. Petty Motor Lease, Inc., Centurian and Nickles sought 
additional relief from the trial court by way of motions to 
amend but such motions were denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc., sought the affirmation by 
this Court as to the liability of Centurian and Nickles. Petty 
Motor Lease, Inc. cross-appealed as to the amount due, the rate 
of interest and for an award of attorney's fees, including fees 
-2-
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on appeal. In its decision, this court addressed all the is-
sues presented to it, including those raised by Centurian an~ 
Nickles in their appeal, and awarded Petty Motor Lease the 
amount claimed and attorneys fees, but denied Petty Motor's 
claim regarding interest. Centurian and Nickles have petition-
ed for rehearing from this Court's decision filed January 19, 
1981. Petty Motor Lease, Inc. submits that the Petition for 
Rehearing should be denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. refers to the Statement of 
Facts contained in its Brief of Respondent, pages 3 through 6. 
In addition, it is pertinent to note certain provisions of the 
Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase. The Lease called for 
32 monthly payments of $580.00, a total of $18,560.00, plus use 
tax. In addition, Centurian deposited with Petty Motor Lease, 
Inc., at the inception of the agreement the sum of $3,594.63. 
Paragraph two of the Agreement of Sale and Purchase 
provides as follows: 
It is agreed that the user [Centurian] will pay to the 
owner [Petty Motor Lease, Inc.] the sum of Six Hundred 
Twenty-·One and 00/100 Dollars plus applicable sales tax and 
interest at six percent per annum (6%), plus any deposits 
or advance payments made and owner shall keep all payments 
made or monies paid or deposited under the terms of the 
lease referred to above. 
The total amount contemplated to be paid under the 
Agreement of Sale and Purchas~ is $18,560 by monthly payments, 
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$3,594.63 by deposit or a total sum of $22,154.63, and $621.00 
plus interest. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE SUPREME COURT SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESSED THE 
ISSUE OF MARGARET K. NICKLES' LIABILITY; THE AGREEMENT BET-
WEEN PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC. AND CENTURIAN, GUARANTEED BY 
MARGARET NICKLES INVOLVED A SECURITY INTEREST SUBJECT TO 
THE LAW OF SALES. 
This Court clearly dealt with the issue Centurian and 
Nickles raise in their Petition for Rehearing regarding Mar-
garet Nickles' liability. In considering the issue of whether 
the agreements between Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and Centurian 
constituted a lease or a sale, this Court stated, in part: 
Under Utah law, when a transaction purports on its 
face to be a lease, but is in fact a sale with reservation 
of a security interest in the vendor, it becomes subject to 
·the law of sales. "Whether a lease is intended as security 
is to be determined by the facts of each case ..• " Liti-
gation relevant to the determination of the nature of an 
agreement under this provision has been profuse, and the 
test formulated thereby numerous. It has been suggested 
that a lease agreement is actually a purchase and sale a-
greement if the "lease payments" are clearly designed to 
establish an ownership interest in the "lessee~" if the 
"lessee" treats the payments as building up equity in the 
property concerned: or if the "lessee" is constrained to 
become the owner of the property at the termination of the 
lease, either by contractual agreement or as a matter of 
economic compulsion. (Footnotes omitted.) 
The agreement between Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and Cen-
turian is subject to the law of sales under all of the fore-
going criteria. Margaret Nickles is liable to Petty Motor 
Lease, Inc., the same as Centurian, having guaranteed the obli-
gation of Centurian. This conclusion is required because of 
the trial court's determination that the agreement between Petty 
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Motor and Centurian was a purchase and sale agreement ab 
initio, or from the beginning; it is therefore of no conse-
quence that Margaret Nickles did not sign the Agreement of Pur-
chase and Sale Agreement. The only relevant inquiry is what 
was Margaret Nickles' guarantee when she guaranteed the written 
lease agreememt. The evidence is clear that the arrangement 
between Petty Motor and Centurian was that of sale and purchase 
from the inception and Nickles understood the arrangement to be 
a purchase. Richard Nickles testified: 
I purchased on the first day of February. This is 
when we negotiated the agreement when we bought the eguip-
me n t . ( Tr 12 , 13 , R . 2 4 4 , 2 4 5 . ) 
The cases as cited by the Court in its opinion consti-
tute conclusive authority that the agreement between Petty Mo-
tor and Centurian was subject to the law of sales, since de-
livery and possession of the trailer to Centurian passed the 
risk of loss to Centurian, and Margaret Nickles, having guaran-
teed the performance of Centurian Corporation, is liable to the 
full extent that Centurian is liable. 
The Lease itself, even without the Agreement of Pur-
chase and Sale, constitutes a security interest to Petty 
Motor. The definition of "security interest" is as follows: 
"Security interest" means an interest in personal pro-
perty or fixtures which secures payment or performance of 
an obligation. The retention or reservation by a seller of 
goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer 
(Section 70 A-2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation 
of a "security interest." ... Whether a lease is intend-
ed as security is to be determined by the facts of each 
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case~ however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase 
does not of itself make the lease one intended for secur-
ity, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the 
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the op-' 
tion to become the owner of the property for no additional 
consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the 
lease one intended for security. (Emphasis added.) 
70A-l-201(37) 
The analysis of the facts of each case to determine 
whether a lease is intended as security is purely objective. 
The objective analysis in this case, as to Margaret Nickles, 
should be: If Centurian had made all the payments contemplated 
by the Lease, (and had the trailer not been stolen), would Cen-
turian be constrained to become the owner of the trailer at the 
termination of the Lease as a matter of economic compulsion? 
See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, §22-3, pp. 
759-765 (West 1972). The answer is clearly "Yes." By a nomi-
nal payment, the trailer could be purchased. The amount Cen-
turian would pay to purchase the trailer was substantially less 
than the fair market value of the trailer. Had the trailer not 
been stolen, Margaret Nickles would certainly have asserted, 
after payment of all monthly installments that Centurian was 
entitled to pay the $621 and interest to buy the trailer. 
Even in absence of any agreement for purchase of the 
trailer at the end of the lease term, the Lease constitutes a 
"security agreement." This is because the Lease agreement, and 
the disparity between the payments required under the Lease and 
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those that would be required under a "true lease", secures pay-
rnent of the obligation. 
POINT II. IF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETTY MOTOR AND 
CENTURIAN IS CONSTRUED AS A LEASE AS ASSERTED BY MARGARET 
K. NICKLES, THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES AGAINST MARGARET NICKLES 
WOULD EXCEED DAMAGES AWARDED TO PETTY MOTOR. 
Even if the Agreement of Sale and Purchase is disre-
garded as to Margaret Nickles, Centurian is responsible for the 
safe-keeping and return to Petty Motor Lease, Inc. of the 
trailer under the Lease. This obligation and liability arises 
because of the express provisions of the Lease, which was guar-
anteed by Margaret Nickles. 
The Lease between Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and Centur-
ian provides, in part as follows: 
3. User agrees to continually maintain said property 
in good condition •.• 
7. Upon expiration or termination of this Agreement, 
User shall surrender the unit to Owner in good mechanical 
condition and repairr with tires having at least 50 percent 
of original tread and free from body damage, scratched or 
stripped paint or torn or faded upholstery. Any expense by 
Owner to bring unit to the above described condition shall 
be paid for by User. 
Considering the Lease only, the foregoing provisions 
clearly indicate that Centurian was responsible for the care, 
maintenance and return of the trailer. By agreement, Centurian 
agreed to be responsible for the return of the trailer. A les-
see is not an insurer of safety of goods delivered to him, un-
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less made so by statute or by express contract. 8 Arn.Jur.2d 
(1980), Bailments, § 215. As stated at 8 Am.Jur.2d (1980), 
Bailments, § 150: 
As a general rule; if there is an express or implied agree-
ment by the bailee which clearly goes beyond its ordinary 
obligation as implied by law, he will be held to this a-
greement. In such cases the bailment contract is control-
ling and must be enforced according to its terms, irre-
spective of the fact that a less onerous liability is im-
posed by law on bailees of the same class generally. For 
such an undertaking, the bailment itself or the compensa-
tion to be paid for it is a sufficient consideration. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
See Sumsion v. Streator-Smith Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 
(1943). 
The agreement of the parties may result in the lessee 
becoming an insurer. This rule is stated at 8 Am Jur.2d 
(1980), Bailments, § 153: 
An express agreement by the bailee, not merely to re-
turn the subject of the bailment in good condition, but to 
repair all damages occasioned by accident or casualty, or 
to be "responsible" for, or to repair any loss or damage, 
barring ordinary wear and tear, creates an unconditional 
obligation, and for loss or damage not excepted the bailee 
is liable irrespective of his negligence or fault. The 
bailee becomes an insurer also where he enters into a--
special contract to return the property in good condition 
or pay its val~e and is liable for any loss which occurs 
while it is in his possession even thoug_h without his 
fault. And where he contracts specially to return the 
baile~roperty in as_g_ood ~ondition as when received sav-
ing some other exception or exceptions than ordinary wear 
and tear, such exceptions m~ be regarded as exclusive, and 
h~ may be liable as an insurer for loss from other causes, 
although without his fault. 
The view is generally taken that the fact that the 
bailee deposits a sum of money or gives a bond as security 
for the return for the bailment in good condition evidences 
an intension to extend his common law liability. There is, 
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moreover, authority for the view that whenever the bailee 
is deemed to have entered into a special engagement to re-
turn the property at a certain time in good order he will 
not be released therefrom even where it appears that the · 
property was damaged or destroyed without his fault. ~ . · 
(Emphasis added: footnotes omitted.) 
The Lease clearly places on Centurian the obligation of return-
ing the trailer and, therefore, assuming the risk of loss of 
the trailer prior to its return. 
Margaret Nickles asserts that her liability under the 
lease is limited to an amount less than $2,000. The contention 
is based upon the provision in the Lease that provides that if 
the Lease is terminated or expires, the lessee shall pay 45% of 
the monthly rental multiplied by the number of months remaining 
on the lease, plus the final lease payment. However, Margaret 
Nickles totally ignores the Lease provision requiring the re-
turn of the equipment. Thus, even accepting Margaret Nickles 
argument as far as it goes, she would be liable for something 
less than $2,000, plus the value of the trailer since she is 
unable to perform the obligation of returning it to Petty Motor 
because of the loss by theft. 
Richard Nickles testified that the value of the 
trailer at the time of the theft was $22,000 (Tr.14). Walter 
A. Cripps testified that the value of the trailer was between 
$14,500 and $15,000 (Tr.38). Neuman C. Petty, President of 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. testified that the value of the trailer 
was between $15,000 and $16,000 (Tr.47). Assuming the trial 
-9-
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court were to find a favorable value to Margaret Nickles of 
$15,000 at the time of loss, she would be obligated to Petty 
Motor for approximately $17,000, exclusive of sales tax and 
interest. This amount is in excess of the amount for which 
Centurian is obligated as a result of this Court's decision in 
this case. 
This Court is entitled to adopt as the measure of darn-
ages awarded against Margaret Nickles the lesser amount which 
will compensate Petty Motor under the provisions of the Lease 
and Agreement of Sale and Purchase. 
POINT III. THE LEASE AGREEMENT MAKES CENTURIAN RE-
SPONSIBLE FOR THE RETURN OF THE TRAILER AND FOR FAILURE TO 
RETURN THE TRAILER CENTURIAN IS LIABLE FOR ITS VALUE; MAR-
GARET NICKLES AS GUARANTOR OF THE LEASE, IS LIABLE UNDER 
THE LEASE INCLUDING THE VALUE OF THE TRAILER. 
Counsel for Margaret Nickles relies on the common law 
rule that in the absence of negligence a lessee is not liable 
for an act of the third party intervenor, such as a theft. 
However, as indicated in Point II of this brief, counsel for 
Ma+garet Nickles totally ignores the express provisions of the 
Lease which abrogates the common law rule. See 8 Am.Jur.2d 
(1980) § 150 and 153, 214 and 215. The Lease required Centur-
ian to return the trailer. For failure to do sor under the 
Lease, Centurian would be liable for the value of the trailer. 
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Margaret Nickles, as guarantor of the Lease, is similarly 
liable. 
POINT IV. NO ELECTION OF REMEDIES IS NECESSARY OR 
REQUIRED BY PETTY MOTOR LEASE. 
Appellants' Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing 
asserts an election of remedy was required, was made, and bars 
the claim of Petty Motor Lease against Margaret Nickles. As 
indicated in Point I, above, Margaret Nickles' liability is 
identical to Centurian's, as determined by this Court. 
Counsel for Centurian and Nickles misconstrues or 
seeks to have this Court misapply the rule of election of reme-
dies. "The doctrine of election of remedies does not apply 
where the available remedies are concurrent, or cumulative, and 
consistent." 25 Am. Jur. 2d (1966), Election of Remedies, § 12. 
The Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase, as construed by 
the trial court, and as affirmed by this court, and ai applied 
to Margaret Nickles in relation to Centurian, are concurrent or 
cumulative, and consistent. The heart of this case is the risk 
of loss, as between lessor and lessee {under Margaret Nickles' 
theory), or seller and buyer. Under either theory, Centurian 
bore the risk of loss, and Margaret Nickles guaranteed the 
Lease, if not the agreement of purchase as well. The risk of 
loss issue is a consistent issue, regardless of the theory. In 
-11-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
addition, the agreement of Purchase and Sale is cumulative, the 
trial court having found, and this Court having affirmed, that 
the Lease remains in effect except as modified by the Agreement 
of Sale and Purchase. It is clear that the Lease and Agreement 
of Sale and Purchase do not provide inconsistent remedies, a 
requirement of an election of remedies: 
§ 10. Inconsistent remedies. 
The doctrine of election of remedies is applicable 
only where there are two or more coexistent remedies avail-
able to the litigant at the time of the election which are 
repugnant and inconsistent. This rule is upon the theory 
that, of several inconsistent remedies, the pursuit of one 
necessarily involves or implies the negation of the 
others. The rule of irrevocable election does not apply 
where the remedies are concurrent or cumulative merely, or 
where they are for the enforcement of different and dis-
tinct rights or the redress of different and distinct 
wrongs. 
§ 11. -·- Test of inconsistency. 
It has been said that the so-called "inconsistency of 
remedies" is not in reality an inconsistency between the 
remedies themselves, but must be taken to mean that a cer-
tain state of facts relied on as the basis of a certain 
remedy is inconsistent with, and repugnant to, another cer-
tain state of facts relied on as the basis of another re-
medy. For one proceeding to be a bar to another for incon-
sistency~ the remedies must proceed from opposite and irre-
concilable claims of right and must be so inconsistent that 
a party could not logically assume to follow one without 
renouncing the other. Two modes of redress are inconsis-
tent if the assertion of one involves the negation or repu-
diation of the other. In this sense, inconsistency may · 
arise either because one remedy must allege as fact what 
the other denies, or because the theory of one must neces-
sarily be repugnant to the other. More particularly, where 
the election of a remedy assumes the existence of a parti-
cular status or relation of the party to the subject matter 
of litigation, another remedy is inconsistent if, in order 
to seek it, the party must assume a different and incon-
sistent status or relation to the subject matter. 
25 Arn Jur 2d (1966), Election of Remedies. {Footnotes 
omitted.) 
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Cases cited in Appellants' Brief in support of the 
petition for rehearing are consistent with the foregoing and .do 
not stand as a bar as asserted by counsel for Centurian. In 
Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 86 U. 364, 35 
P. 2d 842 (1934) , this Court considered whether an employee of 
the Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company, injured in the course 
of his employment, was injured while engaged in interstate com-
merce or intrastate commerce. If injured while engaged in in-
terstate commerce, the legal remedy for the injury was under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), whereas if in-
jured while engaged in intrastate commerce, the remedy was un-
der the Workmen's Compensation Act of Utah. This Court held 
that the employee's bringing of an action in the Federal Dis-
trict Court under FELA did not constitute an election nor pre-
elude him from thereafter claiming compensation under the Work-
men's Compensation Act in state court. 
In Farmer & Merch. Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Cre~it 
Corp, 4 U. 2d 155, 289 P. 2d 1045 (1955) this court stated: 
The doctrine of election of remedies applies as a bar only 
·where the two actions are inconsistent, generally based 
upon incompatible facts~ the doctrine does not operate as 
an estoppel where the two or more remedies are given to 
redress the same wr.ong and are consistent. 
In summary, no election of remedies was required, and 
reliance on both the Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase 
does not create an inconsistency of remedies. 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of this Court is correct and complete. 
Margaret Nickles is liable as the guarantor of Centurian in the 
full amount awarded to Petty Motor Lease. 
The Petition for Rehearing should be denied. 
Dated this 9th day of March, _ 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
By~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Wayne G. Petty 
Attorney for Respondent Petty 
Motor Lease, Inc. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of March, 1981, 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following~ 
James R. Brown, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants in 
Intervention-Respondents 
370 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bryce K. Bryner, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant-Cripps 
215 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
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